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Abstract 
 
 
This conceptual paper proposes a model theory of applying strategic 
management to the field of personnel resource management. When a 
country is about to engage in war, one very important thing to 
understand is the characteristic of the war. In peacetime, the armed 
forces must prepare for wartime. No two wars are identical, because 
war is produced by The Paradoxical Trinity. Therefore, the big 
question is: what is the function and role of Adjutant General corps 
in this increasingly multidimensional war? The recruitment of 
adjutant general personnel can no longer rely solely on officers and 
staff and civil servants on the basis of qualifications as drafted in the 
Conception of the Adjutant General Transformation in order to 
support the basic tasks and functions of Army. The Adjutant General 
corps will also need officers and staff who have experience in the war 
and staff who have comprehensive analysis skill that includes the 
three elements of war in The Paradoxical Trinity. This means that 
Adjutant General should have a specialty in accurately analysing 
personnel’s capabilities. The main advantage of this scheme is 
allowing higher vigilance to anticipate war. The ability to receive 
data and then process it will affect the strength of the army as a 
whole. Upon this conclusion it is recommended to establish a new 
sub directorate which functions are to collect information on 
legislation, daily orders; organizing, inspecting, controlling, and 
mobilizing troops, military punishment, desertions and rotation of 
troops to then analyse it for the purpose of providing reports and 
suggestions for personnel/troop deployment, logistics and 
movements at headquarters and users. The breadth of this function 
will result in the importance of the improvement of the competence 
and position of the Directorate of Adjutant General from Brigadier 
General to Major General. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a country is about to engage in war, 
one very important thing to understand is 
the characteristic of the war. Because when 
an interaction takes place during war, each 
party will dynamically attempt to dictate its 
opponent so that they can utilize the 
advantages they possess while exploiting 
the opponent's weaknesses at the same time. 
We need to admit that, in today's modern 
situation, identifying those things will be 
more difficult. It is true then what Carl Von 
Clausewitz says (in his book, “On War”), 
that “War is an art not a 
science”(Clausewitz, 1908). To carry out 
war, one should not only follow a set of 
rules or principles as their guidelines, even 
if it is trusted. Victory in war is often 
determined by the talents of its military 
leaders. However, Clausewitz affirmed that 
war is an organized use of force. Hence only 
those who are well organized can win the 
battle. Although in some battles, this is not 
entirely true. 
The Napoleonic Wars gave many 
lessons, some of them gave rise to one big 
question that had to be answered; how the 
French troops under Napoleon achieved 
great success in Europe while their soldiers 
were poorly trained, undisciplined, lacking 
talented officers, lacking logistical support, 
lacking organizational structures and so on. 
It was founded then that the answer is 
strongly correlated to the transformation of 
society that emerged at that time in France 
who wanted to establish a nation-state of 
France. In other words, the militancy of the 
French people at that time was an 
extraordinary force that mobilized its troops 
in such a way that it was not easy to defeat. 
Therefore, in order to conquer the French 
army, it is not enough to know its war 
strategy and tactics, but also to know the 
political context underlying its war strategy. 
The Indonesian war of independence is 
another example of this situation. The 
Dutch army and even the allied (British) 
army that had just won World War II; well 
organized troops and armed with modern 
equipment can be defeated by a group of 
people's security forces? This case not only 
teaches the importance of militancy to us, 
but also the importance in ensuring the 
greatest strength of our armed forces, i.e. 
the unity of the army and the spirit of 
nationalism of its people, is not 
compromised. 
In peacetime, the armed forces must 
prepare for wartime. No two wars are 
identical, because war is produced by The 
Paradoxical Trinity - agreement and 
balance of decisions and policies of three 
elements: People, Military and 
Government. The new balance between the 
three will be greatly influenced by the 
conditions of the times, territories and also 
by what is happening in other countries and 
regions. But it is the experience of other 
people's wars that will at least serve as the 
basis for analysis of the current and 
upcoming war through a model composed 
of the interaction of each element of the 
parties in accordance with existing war 
theories. This model should be the initial 
foundation of the strategy to be 
implemented as "a set of rules or principles 
as the standard guide." 
What are we facing right now? Which 
battles and wars are we going through? 
Even the crucial question arises: in 
accordance with the definition described by 
KASAD General Gatot Nurmantyo (“Pesan 
Perang dari Jaarbeurs [The War Message 
from Jaarbeurs],” 2015), that war is 
essentially a matter of killing or being 
killed. Hence, we must have sufficient 
understanding on where and who we should 
kill. In essence, battle cannot be won by a 
single branch, but will be won by involving 
multiple branches. Misunderstanding on 
this principle will create a collateral damage 
that can undermine the morale of troops due 
to the decline of people’s support. This can 
be seen from the mistakes of American 
soldiers who failed to understand the 
situation in the Vietnam war, which resulted 
in a crushing defeat. America failed to 
understand Ho Chi Minh's head so they 
were unable to understand the reason 
behind the movement of his troops. 
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Therefore, the big question is: what is the 
function and role of Adjutant General corps 
in this increasingly multidimensional war? 
History teaches us that in addition to 
Napoleon, the greatest Captain in history, 
there is also Helmuth von Moltke, the 
greatest war manager in the modern era of 
war. Our choice in acquiring wisdom must 
necessarily be based on the experiences of 
others and the circumstances in which we 
and our wars are in progress. For as Moltke 
said that during the peace period, the 
adjutant general should spend as much time 
as possible to prepare for wartime in regard 
to how to employ people, troops and 
maneuvers (Ropp, 1970). 
The main problem that will be discussed 
in this paper on strategic management in the 
field of military personnel resource 
management is “What is the strategic role 
of Directorate of Adjutant General in 
supporting and strengthening the battle 
operations of infantry brigade unit?” 
This paper, which on strategic 
management field especially military 
personnel resource management, aims to 
find out the strategic role of Directorate of 
Adjutant General in supporting and 
strengthening the battle operations of 
infantry brigade unit. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Infantry Brigade 
Infantry is a branch of military force that 
relies on foot as troops that engaged, fight 
and confront the enemy face to face. These 
troops will usually have the greatest 
casualties both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Historically, as the oldest 
branch of army, infantry is the spearhead of 
the modern army, and is constantly 
undergoing training that demands more 
physical and psychological strain than any 
other branch of military force. 
Infantry can enter and maneuver in 
terrains that military vehicles and military 
personnel cannot penetrate with heavy 
weaponry. Transport and delivery of 
modern infantry to engage in combat will 
usually use parachute or helicopter air 
strikes and amphibious landing from the 
sea. 
Most of the Indonesian troops consist of 
infantry. This is because the procurement of 
infantry troops is the easiest and cheapest. 
Infantry is the largest corps and the 
backbone of the Army. Indonesian Army 
Has no less than 89 Infantry Battalions. In 
addition to the Infantry Battalion under the 
command of the Army, there are still 10 
Marine Infantry Battalions under the 
command of the Marine Corps of the Navy. 
Infantry are the main ground combat 
troops, i.e. foot soldiers equipped with light 
weapons, trained and prepared to carry out 
close combat. Around the 16th century in 
England, the Infantry was employed as an 
army that walked to the battlefield, and 
fought and defeated the enemy directly - 
usually aims to take and conquer the terrain. 
As such, war victory without the presence 
of infantry within the enemy's defensive 
barrier has hardly ever occurred for 
centuries. 
 
Adjutant General 
The phrase adjutant general came from the 
Spain word, ayudante, which means senior 
staff who works in General’s office. This 
phrase first appeared in military 
terminology around the 17th century. There 
are many definitions of adjutant general in 
the world but each has similarities in at least 
two things: The adjutant general may mean 
senior staff assigned as assistant general; 
and a personnel organizing body. 
In France, during the beginning of 
French Revolution, adjutant general was a 
senior staff member assigned as an assistant 
to the office of general. This position was 
for lieutenant colonel and colonel. Since 
1795, only colonels can fulfill this position. 
Then since 1800 it was entered into the 
commander's aide position. Since 1803, the 
position of the adjutant general begins with 
the colonel. In the Russian empire adjutant 
general was the assistant of the Tsar, 
Marshal or general. In the United Kingdom, 
the adjutant general was the most senior 
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staff officer in the British army. He is 
responsible for the making of personnel 
policy and supporting the armed forces. 
In India, the adjutant general is senior 
administrative staff for the Indian army and 
reports to the Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces. Pakistan has its peculiarities – its 
Adjutant General includes the judge 
advocate general, as a legal officer. As for 
the model structure of Adjutant General in 
the American armed forces, in many 
respects have similar structures and 
functions with the corps of Adjutant 
General in Indonesia. 
 
Role 
In an effort to understand the duties and 
functions of adjutant general, it helps to 
read General Thiebault's notes (Sigler, 
2006a), “Manuel des Adjudans generaux” 
(Sigler, 2006b), around the end of 
November, after the battle of Arcole, 
November 15-17, 1796. Captain Thiébault 
has just begun his duties as an adjoint 
(assistant) in Masséna division under the 
leadership of adjudant général Jean-
Baptiste Solignac (1773-1850). One of his 
first assignments was to deliver a report to 
Bonaparte's headquarters: 
“I thought this was the most important 
part of my servitude: the speed of 
delivering the shipment, but I was 
wrong. The commander invited me into 
his room, took a report from my hand 
and read it carefully. He started giving 
me a lot of questions that were more 
numerous and faster than what I 
imagined. Bonaparte checks the number 
and conditions of the General Masséna 
forces, its logistical situation, location, 
the position of the hospital against the 
enemy” (Sigler, 1895). 
Thiébault, however, only responds to a 
small portion of these questions. Bonaparte 
was far from satisfied, but Thiebault was 
satisfied although a little. It may be this 
episode that forces him to think critically 
about the importance of systematic 
preparation and the staff’s theoretical 
capabilities. 
Under the same principle, the stigma that 
Directorate of Adjutant General is only for 
personnel administration should be 
changed. This stigma has been embedded 
since the establishment of Staff "A" dated 
December 19, 1949 which is the forerunner 
of the Adjutant General organization 
(Organisasi Kementerian Pertahanan dan 
Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia, 
1949). We can see that the function of 
Adjutant General in Staff “A” organization 
is limited to personnel administration, not 
management. Therefore, Corps of Adjutant 
General is only tasked to administer 
military personnel instead of managing 
them. Therefore, in order to answer the 
challenge of modern war which dynamics 
tend to be far quicker, Corps of Adjutant 
General should be tasked with more than 
just administration – they should be tasked 
to provide suggestions for the field general 
and army headquarter on the deployment of 
personnel. 
Deploying and lodging infantrymen in 
combat will only be appropriate if we have 
accurate data on the strengths and 
weaknesses of our opponents and also our 
own strengths and weaknesses. The main 
change from this scheme is the addition of 
analytical function that will be employed to 
provide suggestion for war strategy to the 
infantry generals in the field, but not on 
tactical level. 
We must understand that the main 
purpose of war is to weaken and then 
destroy the enemy forces. A total war aimed 
at defeating and then dominating other 
nations. Fighter planes, sea ships will only 
weaken the enemy forces while the infantry 
troops in the field will ensure whether or not 
the enemy has been defeated – meaning 
being destroyed and conquered. Destroying 
the enemy by not conquering the state and 
its people will undermine the meaning of 
victory (Howe, 2015). The infantry ensures 
every detail of the victory is sought. On the 
other hand, heavy equipment and 
technology is not something that can be 
easily transferred from street to street or 
from one area to another (Beckett, 2009). 
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But this will lead to increased risk and 
sacrifice – a war reduced to its most 
essential principle, killing or being killed. 
The scheme that adopts de Bourcet's 
work on maréchal-des-logis d'armée (Hittle 
& Wilkinson, 1915) adds the administrative 
function of personnel data into personnel 
deploying and lodging analysis. This will 
facilitate the field infantry commander in 
determining appropriate tactics based on 
their own intuition. No matter how modern 
war has become today, when ground battles 
occur the function of the infantry brigade 
will go back to conventional wars – that war 
is just a matter of numbers and numerical 
calculation. Therefore, the preparation of 
statistical data becomes important as an 
analysis material, not only for analysts in 
the adjutant general's office but for infantry 
commanders in the field. The expansion of 
the function of the adjutant general will 
obviously come with the risk of friction, 
“Any reorganization of the staff of the 
Army without the introduction of General 
Staff is doomed to failure” (William 
Harding Carter, 1918). After all, 
recognizing the reorganization and the 
limits of delegation of authority and 
liability of the unit and a commander must 
be done with caution. 
We can see that in ground battle, the 
infantry brigade is the spearhead of the 
armed forces. These troops are the most 
reliable eyes to see the enemy, capable of 
providing a field analysis on the strategies 
set by headquarters and intelligence 
analysts. This will change the meaning of 
modern war in which almost all of its battles 
are carried out and directed at a distance. 
Ground battles are a traditional war that 
requires traditional war tactics as well. 
Therefore, the strategy to be suggested by 
the adjutant general is intended to reduce 
the number of victims on our side. It is the 
accuracy of data that will reduce the 
unnecessary victims of ground battle. 
Ground battles today are no longer 
merely guerrilla warfare, which is one of the 
strengths of our infantry brigade, but a new 
model of guerrilla warfare where trees are 
replaced with dense housing, mountains are 
replaced with multi-story buildings, and 
rivers are replaced with culverts and 
underground aqueducts. The war of the city 
as a new guerrilla war would have to be 
addressed with different strategies and 
tactics. The need for real-time battle 
information data will become an 
increasingly urgent need. The Headquarter 
of Adjutant General Corps should provide 
this accurate information based on the 
personnel database that it owns. Unlike the 
adjutant general at the brigade level who 
only has limited personnel data on his 
brigade, Headquarters has a wider range of 
data. This is intended to immediately 
provide real-time personnel advice based on 
the needs of combat commanders in the 
field for the problems they face – which 
might include needs for personnel, 
equipment and of course movement 
infantry forces based on the analysis of the 
movement of enemy personnel. 
Failure of army headquarters in 
managing assets/personnel can be learned 
from the case of Strelkov (Dugin, 2014). 
How could it be that Putin failed to 
capitalize on his personnel in Ukraine, and 
let Igor Ivanovich Strelkov lead nearly 
20,000 infantries against the whole 
country? In fact, the lack of personnel data 
made Putin asked:  
“On whose behalf and in whose name is 
he fighting? He has been holding the 
defense of Slavyansk and of the entire 
DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic] for so 
long. Who gives him orders? Who stands 
behind him? Who is this Strelkov?”  
However, there is also the possibility that 
this was Russia’s tactic to claim uninvolved 
in anything that happened in Crimea, 
Slavyansk, Donetsk, Ukraine (Winnerstig, 
Carlsson, Hedenskog, Sundberg, & Pallin, 
2014). 
Based on that, the recruitment of adjutant 
general personnel can no longer rely solely 
on officers and staff and civil servants based 
on the qualification degree of State 
Administration, Human Resource 
Management, Bahasa Indonesia, 
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Informatics Engineering, Information 
Systems, Informatics Management, 
Computer Engineering, Arts/Music, and 
Karawitan, as conceptualized in the 
Conception of the Adjutant General 
Transformation in order to support the basic 
tasks and functions of Army.  Corps of 
Adjutant General will also need officers and 
staff who have combat experience in the 
field as well as staff who have 
comprehensive analytical skill covering all 
three elements of war in The Paradoxical 
Trinity (William H. Carter, 1902): People, 
Military and Government–ours and 
enemy’s. This means that adjutant general 
personnel will need to have specialty in 
accurate personnel analysis in addition to 
understanding the basic task of a general’s 
aide. 
Therefore, the duties of adjutant general 
at the level of Brigade, battalion and so on 
should include managing information on 
personnel data, formation, organization, 
movement and history copy of the 
command of general/commander. This will 
allow a better and more accurate crosscheck 
process before deploying troops. At the 
same time, the administrative measurement 
design can be made to improve the strength 
of the discipline, morale and system as a 
whole, and above all improves the combat 
abilities of the infantry forces and the 
strength of the army in general. 
The main advantage of this scheme is 
allowing higher vigilance to anticipate the 
increasingly varied and bigger war. The 
accuracy of personnel data and its analysis 
will allow the directorate of adjutant general 
to provide continuous, up-to-date, accurate 
and sustainable advice on the reform and 
transformation of the Army. This data 
analysis must be supported by a steady 
supply of data from each troop. It even 
includes daily commands to every person in 
the morning, about what to do during the 
next 24 hours. This is an additional task to 
be undertaken by the staff of the adjutant 
general – making a daily performance 
report. The staffs of the adjutant general are 
military personnel who should be the first to 
know every issue that affects troops. Then, 
issues that require major decisions that 
could affect the capabilities of the operating 
unit should be communicated to the 
commander. The ability to receive and then 
process this data will affect the strength of 
the army as a whole. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. To win the battle and the war, field 
general/commander of infantry forces 
requires accurate data and advice. The 
data and analysis include the number and 
conditions of the troops, its logistical 
situation, location, and the position of 
our side’s and enemy’s supporting 
system. 
2. Analysis to personnel and other relevant 
matters will provide suggestion on the 
deployment of infantry personnel and its 
supporting personnel to win the 
aforementioned battle. 
3. To produce accurate analysis, the staff of 
the directorate general should be 
recruited and developed not only from 
the adjutant's branch but other branches 
as well. This is in order to ensure that 
adjutant general is capable to conduct 
accurate personnel analysis and useful to 
the field troops due to its administrative 
and combat competence.  
4. This analysis aims to minimize losses 
and casualties either on the infantry 
brigade as the spearhead of combat or on 
the part of stakeholders and to win the 
war in general. 
 
SUGGESTIONS 
1. Establish a new sub directorate which 
functions are to collect information on 
legislation, daily orders; organizing, 
inspecting, controlling, and mobilizing 
troops, military punishment, desertions 
and rotation of troops to then analyze it 
for the purpose of providing reports and 
suggestions for personnel/troop 
deployment, logistics and movements at 
headquarters and users.  
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2. More thorough research and details will 
be necessary to find the most likely form 
of this function. 
3. The breadth of this function will result in 
the importance of the improvement of 
the competence and position of the 
Directorate of Adjutant General from 
Brigadier General to Major General. 
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